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Abstract
This paper investigates how a country’s specific-factors endowment aﬀects its
long-run economic performance. We build an open-economy version of the two-
sector neoclassical growth model in which we introduce fixed industry-specific
inputs in both activities. We show that diﬀerences in input shares between
sectors can contribute to explain why nations that seem to have similar fac-
tor endowments can show very diﬀerent income levels. In particular, under
(productivity-adjusted) factor-price equalization, larger amounts of factors spe-
cific to the industry with a lower (larger) labor share lead the economy to enjoy
larger (smaller) long-run income levels. The model can also account for overtak-
ing episodes between countries along their development paths.
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1 Introduction
This paper introduces fixed specific factors into an open-economy version of the stan-
dard two-sector neoclassical growth model. The main contribution of the paper is
to provide conditions under which a larger endowment of an industry-specific factor
has negative eﬀects and conditions under which it has positive eﬀects on a country’s
long run income level. The paper can therefore explain why some nations that seem
to have similar endowments can show very diﬀerent income levels. Our hypothesis
is that one source of this diﬀerence can lie in the input intensities displayed by the
industries to which these factors are specific.
The importance of industry-specific factors has been recognized at least since the
work of Ricardo (1871).1 However, their impact on long run income and growth is not
yet well understood. To illustrate this, take the example of a very important set of
specific factors: the natural resources. These include land in agriculture, large bodies
of water and coal in energy generation, and all kinds of minerals in their respec-
tive extractive industries. There is puzzling empirical evidence on the relationship
between the natural-resource endowment and a nation’s economic performance. On
the one hand, we observe that large factor endowments can sometimes be a curse in
terms of income. For instance, along history, resource-poor economies such as the
Netherlands and Japan outperformed resource-rich nations such as Spain and Rus-
sia. Nowadays, most Asian tigers are resource-poor, whereas growth losers such as
Nigeria, Zambia, Sierra Leone, and Venezuela are resource-rich. Gylfason (2001) and
Sachs and Warner (2001) also argue that resource abundant countries lag, on average,
behind countries with less resources. On the other hand, natural-input abundance
seems to be a blessing some other times. World Bank (1994) finds at least five nations
that belong to both the top eight regarding natural capital wealth and the top fifteen
regarding per capita income.
Solving this puzzle is important for several developing countries, such as the ones
in the middle East and Latin America, where the discovery of natural resources has
1Recent evidence finds also support for the specific-factors model of international trade. Kohli
(1993) reports estimates of the specific factors and the Heckscher-Ohlin models of international
trade for the US economy and finds that the former performs better than the latter, although US
data display quite systematically some properties which are more in line with a Heckscher-Ohlin
production structure. Rassekh and Thompson (1997) point out as well that a world in which each
sector has some specific factor is at least as likely as one in which all inputs can freely move across
activities. For diﬀerences between the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the standard specific-factors model
of international trade, see for example Jones and Neary (1988).
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been considered as a positive precondition for more growth. Premise that, in light of
the existent evidence, is not at all guaranteed.
We study a world economy where the production structure consists of the two-
sector neoclassical growth model with consumption and investment goods, in the
tradition of Oniki-Uzawa (1965), in which the diﬀerent industries have diﬀerent input
intensities. Firms in both sectors employ product-specific factors. There is also
an alternative technology to produce investment goods that only requires mobile
resources. Population is constant and consists of identical infinitely-lived agents. A
small open economy shares preferences and technologies with the rest of the world
but it can have diﬀerent specific-factors endowments. As a result of this specification
the model exhibits both Heckscher-Ohlin and specific-factors properties.
The paper shows that diﬀerences in input shares across activities can represent
a key element in explaining the eﬀect of specific-factor endowments on a small-open
nation’s economic performance. More specifically, larger amounts of inputs that are
specific to an activity with a relatively large capital share lead the small nation to
enjoy higher long-run welfare levels. On the contrary, larger stocks of factors that
are specific to the less capital intensive sector have a negative influence on capital
accumulation. This negative influence can totally oﬀset the positive eﬀect of the larger
specific-factor endowment and lead the economy to permanently lower income levels
if the technology to which this input is specific possesses a larger labor share than
the technology that frees labor as a consequence of the increase in the specific-factor.
The negative eﬀect, on the other hand, disappears if the small country specializes in
the production of one good. Under specialization, a larger endowment always raises
long-run capital and output. The model predicts as well overtaking episodes between
small open economies along their development paths.
The impact on long-run aggregate output of a rise in a factor specific to a more
(less) labor intensive sector is always negative (positive) when international factor
price equalization (FPE) holds. Although the empirical validity of the FPE is mixed,
it has recently found considerable support. Trefler (1993) shows that a weak form
of the FPE theorem that allows for factor-augmenting productivity diﬀerences is
empirically consistent with observed cross-country variation in factor prices. This
is the type of FPE that the model obtains in the long run. It obtains it because it
incorporates an industry that only employs the accumulable factor and intersectorally
mobile inputs. When this technology is used, its factor intensities determine the wage
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rate as a function of the long-run rental price of capital that, in Ramsey-type models,
is pinned down solely by the international relative price of commodities and the
common subjective discount factor. We also show that FPE is not necessary for a
larger natural endowment to generate a negative impact on long run income, although
it makes the existence of this perverse eﬀect more likely.
The concern on the possibility of negative real income eﬀects arising from an aug-
mented resource is an old issue in development economics. The literature has already
identified at least two channels through which an increase in a specific factor aﬀects
the allocation of resources and lead to a decrease in income. The first one operates
through changes in international prices. In particular, the extensive literature on im-
miserizing growth or on the structural problems arising from a discovery of a natural
resource (the called ‘Dutch disease’) shows that the possibility of a negative eﬀect
on income arises when either the terms of trade deteriorate or the real exchange rate
worsens.2 This eﬀect is ruled out in our model because international prices remain
constant due to the small-country assumption. Second, there can be a technology
channel that operates through diﬀerences in the overall eﬃciency level. For example,
Matsuyama (1992) and Galor and Mountford (2002) emphasize that a larger natural
endowment reduces the incentives to allocate resources to more growth-enhancing
activities such as manufacturing and education, and therefore decreases long-run
output. This mechanism is also absent in our model given that technological change
is factor neutral and sector neutral.
Here, we point to the relevance of a third channel, driven by the small open
economy assumption. Specific factors create diﬀerences in total factor productivity
(TFP) across nations. Thus, ceteris paribus, a country with a higher level of a specific
factor should have a higher income per capita, because of this TFP eﬀect. However,
unlike exogenous diﬀerences in TFP, an increase in a specific factor reallocates capital
and labor from the rest of the economy to the sector to which the input is specific.
This shift in resources aﬀects the aggregate demand of labor and capital in a way
that depends on input intensities. In a small-open economy for which the world’s
relative price is rigid, the latter Rybczynski eﬀect implied by the augmented factor
can reverse the positive TFP eﬀect, and lead the economy to a lower long-run income
level.3
2See, for example, Eaton (1992) and Edwards and Van Wijnbergen (1992).
3This is in contrast to the predictions of closed-economy growth frameworks, in which an increase
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Our work is also related to dynamic international trade models that determine sav-
ings from utility maximization. Eaton (1987) is the first to take the Jones-Samuelson
specific-factors model to a dynamic setting. He considers that land (a fixed factor)
is used specifically in the production of one commodity, that capital (an accumu-
lable resource) is the specific input in the production of the other commodity, and
that labor is used commonly in both production activities. Except in a very special
case, Eaton’s (1987) model does not predict international FPE because of its over-
lapping generations structure. As in our model, a land abundant country can have a
lower steady state welfare but under diﬀerent and more restrictive conditions.4 Brock
and Turnovsky (1993) use the same type of model as Eaton to study the impact of
diﬀerential tariﬀs on welfare.
Markusen and Manning (1993) embed the Jones specific-factors model into a
representative-agent framework to include the optimal accumulation of (one or two)
specific inputs. They show, using a mechanism similar to ours, that the production
structure in Eaton (1987) leads to FPE in the long-run with infinitely lived consumers.
They, however, consider a less general production structure, and do not analyze the
eﬀects of larger endowments on long-run income.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic
environment. Section 3 studies the diversified production equilibrium of the world
economy. Section 4 analyzes how the composition of the factor endowment aﬀects the
steady-state outcome of a small open economy, both qualitative and quantitatively.
Section 5 discuses the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The world economy
Consider a world where economic activity takes place over infinite discrete time. In
every period, two goods are produced — a perishable consumption good and an invest-
ment good — using four inputs of production. The production of both the consumption
in a resource endowment aﬀects relative prices, and always induces a positive eﬀect on long-run
capital and income. See, for example, Kögel and Prskawetz (2001), Hansen and Prescott (2002),
Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2002), and Gollin, Parente and Rogerson (2002) that focus on the role of
land in production.
4 In the steady state, FPE holds in Eaton’s (1987) model only when both sectors have identical
labor shares in production. In that case, a land-abundant country can have a lower steady state level
of capital, but the overall eﬀect of land on long-run income is ambiguous. When FPE does not hold,
a fall in steady state welfare from a larger natural resource endowment arises when the labor share of
the land-using sector is lower than the labor share of the capital-using sector and the initial interest
rate is high; but if the interest rate is initially low, more land always raises steady state welfare.
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and the investment commodities require the use of capital and labor inputs, which
can freely move across sectors, and also of a third factor which is sector-specific. In
addition, there exists a second technology to manufacture the investment good that
only requires mobile inputs.5 All markets are perfectly competitive. Population is
constant.
Specific factors are not produced and do not depreciate, their total amount is
fixed over time. Given these special characteristics, we consider that specific factors
are diﬀerent types of natural resources. Some natural inputs such as land, large
bodies of water, and renewed forests fulfill very well these features. Others, like
copper, uranium and iron, are not produced but depreciate in the sense that they are
depleted systematically. For these other natural inputs to be in fixed supply, their
extraction level had to be constant; we assume this hereafter.6
We have two technologies that can produce the investment good, but only one of
them requires a specific input. This assumption reflects that innovation has allowed
to manufacture synthetic products that serve as good substitutes for some natural
raw materials. An example is the rubber industry that manufactures inputs devoted,
among other uses, to the production of electric insulation, tires, and containers. In
this industry, some firms produce natural latex from rubber trees, a natural input
that can not be employed for any other purpose; whereas other manufactures produce
synthetic rubber from a variety of inputs such as petroleum derivatives that can be
allocated as well to other activities.7
Infinitely-lived consumers discount future utility at rate β, and have preferences
only over consumption. In particular, their preferences are given by
5As it will be clear later, this assumption has no impact on the main results of the paper. We
could also consider two consumption-goods, one of them not requiring for its production a specific
factor. This would not change our main results either.
6More generally, all inputs in some of their forms can be considered as specific factors. For
example, following Ricardo’s (1817) theory of rent and capital accumulation, Eaton (1987) looks at
physical capital as an specific factor. Specialized labor can be also thought as an specific input, as
in Dinopoulos and Sergerstrom (1999). Capital inputs, however, accumulate and are not in fixed
supply. We leave incorporating these other type of specific factors for future research.
7An alternative interpretation is to think of the capital stock as a commodity composed of two
diﬀerent investment goods that, after being produced, become perfect substitutes. From this view-
point, the industry that uses a specific factor could be, for example, a primary sector that extracts
natural diamonds, or petroleum to produce derivatives such as thermoplastic resins. These primary
goods would serve to augment the composite capital stock employed by all sectors in the economy,
including the sector that produces the investment good using only capital and labor. In the real
world, diamonds are used in jewelry as well as industrial production, and the industries that use
thermoplastic resins include, among others, industrial machinery, packaging, and furniture.
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∞X
t=0
βt
c1−σt − 1
1− σ , β ∈ (0, 1) , σ > 0. (1)
Individuals oﬀer labor services and rent capital and natural resources to firms. Nat-
ural resources in the economy are uniformly distributed across all individuals. The
representative consumer faces the following budget constraint
ct + ptxt = rktkt + rnct
µ
Nc
L
¶
+ rnxt
µ
Nx
L
¶
+ wt, (2)
where the evolution of capital is governed by
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xt. (3)
In the above expressions, L represents the constant population size; ct is the per
capita demand for consumption goods; xt is the per capita demand for investment
goods, whose price is pt; rkt, rnct, rnxt, and wt are, respectively, the rental rates of
capital, the consumption-goods specific factor, the investment-goods specific factor,
and labor; Nc andNx denote natural inputs specific to consumption-goods production
and investment-products manufacturing, respectively; and kt is the capital stock own
by the consumer at date t.8 The consumption good is the numeraire.
The representative consumer will maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3), taking as
given the world output prices and the domestic rental rates for production factors.
The Euler equation corresponding to this dynamic programing problem is
ct+1
ct
=
·
pt+1
pt
β
µ
rkt+1
pt+1
+ 1− δ
¶¸1/σ
. (4)
It is standard. It says that the growth rate of consumption depends on the present-
utility value of the rate of return to saving. This return reflects that giving up a
unit of present consumption allows today buying 1/pt units of the investment goods
that, after contributing to the production process, will covert themselves tomorrow
in 1 + rkt+1/pt+1 − δ units, which can be sold at a price pt+1.
The production of the consumption good (Yct) is given by
Yct = AKαkct (EtNc)
αn (EtLct)1−αn−αk = AEtLctnαnct k˜
αk
ct , αn, αk ∈ (0, 1) , (5)
8For notational convenience, we do not allow trade in natural resources among individuals living
in the same country. Notice that this assumption has no eﬀect on our results because all individuals
are alike in the model.
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There are, in turn, two technologies to manufacture investment products, but only
one of them employs natural resources. These technologies are:
Yxt = BKθkxt (EtNx)
θn (EtLxt)1−θk−θn = BEtLxtnθnxt k˜
θk
xt , (6)
Y¯xt = BK¯
θk
xt
¡
EtL¯xt
¢1−θk = BEtL¯xt˜¯kθkxt , θk, θn ∈ (0, 1) . (7)
Above, Et stands for an exogenous level of labor- and specific-factor-augmenting
eﬃciency in period t, common to all sectors, that grows at the constant rate g;
Kit and Lit denote, respectively, the amount of capital and labor devoted in period
t to the production of good i by the sectors that employ specific factors; nit =
Ni/Lit, k˜it = Kit/EtLit, for all i = x, c; Yxt represents investment-goods production
using a specific input in period t; and an upper bar (−) denotes variables related
to investment-goods production that does not use specific inputs. We shall assume
that Nc > 0 and Nx > 0. Moreover, specific-factor technologies have diﬀerent capital
shares, αk 6= θk.
Denote the fraction of labor employed in the production of good i by lit = Lit/L,
and the overall capital stock per eﬃciency unit of labor by k˜t. Notice that because
consumers are alike, the amount of capital own by the representative individual will
equal the world’s capital-labor ratio. Hence, the constraints on labor and capital can
be written as follows:
lct + lxt + l¯xt = 1, (8)
lctk˜ct + lxtk˜xt + l¯xt˜¯kxt = k˜t. (9)
Firms will maximize profits taking as given prices of goods and rental rates on
production factors. Taking into account (5), (6), (7), and assuming that capital and
labor can freely move across firms, production eﬃciency implies that
rkt = αkAnαnct k˜
αk−1
ct = ptθkBn
θn
xt k˜
θk−1
xt = ptθkB
˜¯kθk−1xt , (10)
rnct = αnAEtnαn−1ct k˜
αk
ct , (11)
rnxt = θnAEtnθn−1xt k˜
θk
xt , (12)
wt = (1-αk-αn)AEtnαnct k˜
αk
ct = (1-θk-θn) ptBEtn
θn
xt k˜
θk
xt = (1-θk) ptBEt
˜¯kθkxt .(13)
Of course, these equalities will hold only for the technologies that coexist in
equilibrium. The following two results establish the firms that open in equilibrium.9
9The proofs of propositions 1 and 2 are contained in appendix A.
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Proposition 1 For any wage rate wt and capital rental rate rkt, it is profitable to
operate a technology that uses specific factors if these are found in the economy in a
strictly positive amount.
Proposition 2 Pick Nx > 0. Firms that use the technology that requires only mobile
factors will enter the market if and only if
lˆxt >
Nx
L
µ
1− θk − θn
1− θk
¶1−θk
θn
, (14)
where lˆxt is the fraction of labor employed in the investment goods sector in equilibrium
when only firms that use the specific-factor technology operate. The steady state
equilibrium of this employment share is
lˆ∗x =
Ψ− αk1−αk−αn
θk
1−θk−θn −
αk
1−αk−αn
, (15)
where Ψ is a positive constant defined in Appendix A.
Therefore, an economy that possesses positive endowments of both kinds of nat-
ural resources will use the specific-factor technologies at all times. However, whether
the technology that requires only mobile inputs is operated or not will depend on the
degree of congestion in the use of the natural resource Nx. If Nx/L is suﬃciently
large, no firm will use that technology. In particular, since lˆxt is positive and smaller
than one, no firm will use the non-specific factor technology if
Nx
L
µ
1− θk − θn
1− θk
¶ 1−θk
θn
> 1. (16)
Nevertheless, notice that inequality (14) does not impose a big constraint in the
domain ofNx that supports the coexistence of the three technologies, because whether
or not the inequality is satisfied ultimately depends on the units of measurement for
the natural resourceNx. For this reason, we assume that the world economy possesses
positive amounts of Nx and that these resources are relatively scarce, so condition
(14) holds. Therefore, there are firms in the world economy that produce investment
goods using the specific-factor technology (6), and firms that use the non-specific-
factor technology (7).
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3 A diversified-production equilibrium
In this section we analyze the balanced growth equilibrium of a world economy en-
dowed with positive amounts of specific factors, Nx > 0 and Nc > 0, and such that
condition (14) holds. So there are firms that operate the non-specific input technology
at all times.
In equilibrium, the world economy behaves as a single large and closed economy.
Therefore, the world market clearing conditions for final goods are
ct = AEtlctnαnct k˜
αk
ct , (17)
xt = BEtlxtnθnxt k˜
θk
xt +BEtlxt
˜¯kθkxt . (18)
Let us denote by an asterisk (∗) steady-state outcomes for the world economy.
The consumers’ optimality condition (4) and the world’s market clearing condition
(17) imply
r∗k = p
∗ £β−1 (1 + g)σ + δ − 1¤ . (19)
Defining the wage-capital rental ratio measured in eﬃciency units as ω˜kt = wtEtrkt ,
the eﬃciency conditions in production (10) and (13), and (19) determine the optimal
amount of capital in eﬃcient-labor units in each industry as a function of this relative
factor price:
˜¯kxt =
µ
θk
1− θk
¶
ω˜kt, (20)
k˜ct =
µ
αk
1− αn − αk
¶
ω˜kt, (21)
k˜xt =
µ
θk
1− θk − θn
¶
ω˜kt. (22)
Using the expression for r∗k and condition (10), we obtain the steady-state relative
amount of inputs allocated to firms that do not employ specific factors as
˜¯k∗x =
·
θkB
β−1 (1 + g)σ + δ − 1
¸1/(1−θk)
. (23)
Equations (20) to (23) determine the values of the relative factor prices and capital-
labor ratios along the balanced-growth path. Notice that, at the world’s diversified-
production equilibrium, the steady-state capital-labor ratios across sectors do not
depend on the natural resource endowments. This occurs because these ratios are
a function of factor intensities and the relative factor price ω˜kt, but at steady state
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ω˜∗k is exclusively determined by consumers’ preferences and factor intensities in the
sector that does not use specific inputs.
We next determine the labor allocations. Conditions (13), (20) and (22) imply
that
lxt =
µ
1− θk − θn
1− θk
¶1−θk
θn Nx
L
. (24)
It states that, along a diversified production equilibrium where all available tech-
nologies are used, the amount of labor allocated to the factor-specific production of
investment goods is fixed and positively related to the endowment of the immobile
resource Nx, and to the labor intensity in this technology relative to the labor inten-
sity in the production that only uses mobile inputs. Hence, the steady-state labor
allocation in the factor-specific production of investment goods, l∗x, must be given by
equation (24) if all available technologies are used. From conditions (13), (20) and
(21), we derive the labor allocation to consumption-goods manufacturing as
lct =
"
Aααkk (1− αn − αk)
1−αk
Bθθkk (1− θk)
1−θk
Ã
ω˜αk−θkkt
pt
!# 1
αn Nc
L
. (25)
So the fraction of labor employed in the c-sector depends positively on the specific
factor endowment to this sector and inversely on the relative price of investment
goods pt. The relation between lct and the relative input price ω˜kt will be determined
by the sign of αk − θk. When the production of good x has a larger capital share
(θk > αk) that sign will be negative, and vice versa. Finally, once we know the labor
allocations to the sectors that employ immobile resources (equations (24) and (25)),
the economy’s labor constraint (expression (8)) delivers l¯xt as a residual.
Conditions (20) and (23) determine the steady-state relative input price ω∗k. The
only remaining task to pin down the labor allocations along the balanced-growth path
is then deriving the steady-state relative output price. In order to do this, we first
obtain the steady-state stock of capital per unit of eﬃciency labor. Using equations
(3), (10), (18) and (19), we can write the steady-state stock of capital as
k˜∗ =
·
β−1 (1 + g)σ + δ − 1
θk (δ + g)
¸³
l∗xk˜
∗
x + l¯
∗
x
˜¯k∗xt
´
. (26)
Clearly, the stock of capital must be completely split among its diﬀerent uses given,
in relative terms, by equation (9). This market-equilibrium condition determines p∗.
More specifically, combining equations (8), (9), (13), (20) to (23), (24) and (26), we
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find that
p∗ = Ω ·
"
Nc
L
1 + γNxL
#αn
, (27)
where Ω and γ are positive constants.10
The result is quite intuitive. When the stock of the factor specific to the produc-
tion of consumption goods rises, the economy devotes relatively more resources to the
production of these goods, making investment products relatively more scarce and,
as a consequence, more expensive. Exactly the opposite takes place if the amount of
the factor specific to the investment-goods sector increases.
Therefore, a larger endowment of any given natural factor raises the amount
of labor devoted to the firms that employ it as an input, and decreases the labor
allocation to the sector that operates with only mobile inputs. In addition, a larger
Nx also increases the steady-state labor allocation to the consumption-goods sector.
This indirect eﬀect takes place because the increase in the supply of investment
goods makes their price to decline, which raises the relative value of the marginal
labor productivity in the consumption-goods sector.
4 Factor endowments and the long-run performance of
a small economy
In this section, we deal with the small open economy that diﬀers from the rest of the
world only on the relative endowments of specific factors. We suppose that there is
free trade in consumption and investment goods, but that international movements
of inputs are prohibited. We show that the steady state income level that it achieves
critically depends on the factor intensities of the diﬀerent industries.
Define νi = Ni/L as the per capita amount of natural factor i for i = c, x. Figure
1 illustrates the two possibilities regarding condition (14) for the small open economy.
Panel A shows the eﬀect of an increase in endowment νx, and Panel B the one of a rise
in νc. The dashed lines correspond to the value of the right-hand side of inequality
(14) for diﬀerent endowments νx. Notice that the dashed line is independent of νc.
The value of lˆx (left-hand side in (14)) is pinned down by the intersection of two lines
10Ω =
A
B
·
1+
³ αk
1−αn−αk
´
(1−θk) (δ+g)
(1+g)σβ−1+δ−1−θk(δ+g)
¸αn
³
1−θk
1−αn−αk
´1−αk³ θk
αk
´αkµ (1+g)σβ−1+δ−1
θkB
¶ αk−θk
1−θk
, and γ = θn1−θk−θn
³
1−θk−θn
1−θk
´ 1−θk
θn .
From the firms optimality conditions follows that the relative price of commodities is a monotone
function of ωkt and kt, which guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium price at all times.
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that represent the two sides of equation (49) in Appendix B; only the location of one
of these two lines, the horizontal one, depends on νx and νc. Clearly, the condition
is satisfied if and only if lˆx is to the right of the dashed line. For relatively low values
of νx and νc (thicker horizontal and dashed lines in Panels), condition (14) holds. As
νx (νc) rises, the dashed line shifts to the right (does not move), and the horizontal
solid line moves down (up), making more likely an equilibrium where no firm uses
the non-specific-factor technology. As a consequence, for suﬃciently large values of
νx and νc (thinner lines), condition (14) does not hold and, hence, the economy only
employs two technologies.
For the world economy, fulfilling condition (14) guarantees that the three tech-
nologies are operated because, as the non-specific-factor sector hires more labor,
marginal productivities vary until the new equilibrium is achieved. For the small
economy, however, input prices are exogenous when the three technologies are in use.
Hence, condition (14) is necessary but not suﬃcient for the small economy to be
operating with all technologies. Besides fulfilling that condition, the small country
needs to have an endowment such that the non-specific-factor sector hires in equilib-
rium a strictly positive amount of labor. Let us remove the time subscript to denote
the balanced-growth values of the small country. The following proposition formally
establishes the conditions that determine the firms that open at steady state.
Proposition 3 Assume that the world economy is moving along a balanced growth
path. At the steady-state equilibrium of the small economy, firms that use the tech-
nology that requires only mobile factors will produce if and only if νc and νx are
suﬃciently small to make condition (14) hold and
νc/n∗c + νx/n
∗
x < 1. (28)
The proof of the proposition is simple. We know that proposition 2 must hold
from section 2. In addition, as will be clear later, there is FPE at steady state if the
three technologies are used and this implies that nc = n∗c and nx = n∗x. Therefore,
inequality (28) just states that lc + lx < 1.
In what follows, we assume that the relative input endowments of the small econ-
omy are such that all technologies are used to produce output at steady state.11 This
11See Appendix B for the case when all firms use specific factors, and Appendix C for the case
Nx = 0.
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Figure 1: Condition (14) and the small open economy
xlxl?   1 ,xl?  
xv↑  
xl  xl? 1 ,xl?
cv↑  
Panel A Panel B
is equivalent to supposing that the small economy’s specific-factor endowment is not
too diﬀerent from the world economy’s. Later in this section, we conduct a numerical
exercise that supports that this assumption is not very restricted.
Consumers and firms in the small economy will take as given the international
relative price of goods, p∗, and the domestic rental rates of production factors. Since
the small economy shares with the rest of the world its preferences and technologies,
its optimality conditions for consumption and production will be also the same. In
particular, note that equations (19) to (25) describe also the behavior of any small
open economy regardless of its resource endowment, as long as Nc is positive. There-
fore, under perfectly competitive markets, an open economy that owns resources of
the Nx and Nc types diversifies production and accumulates capital until its rental
rate falls down to the world’s rate r∗k, which is by equation (19) exclusively determined
by consumers’ preferences, the growth rate of technological progress, and p∗. Along
the balanced growth path, expressions (20) to (23) imply that k¯x = k¯∗x, ω˜k = ω˜
∗
k,
k˜c = k˜∗c , and k˜x = k˜∗x. And from expressions (10) to (13), nc = n∗c , nx = n∗x,
rnxt/Et = r∗nxt/E∗t , rnct/E∗t = r∗nct/E∗t , and wt/Et = w∗t /E∗t . In sum, in the long
run, factor eﬃciency-price equalization will hold, and the country will be using the
same techniques as the rest of the world. Notice that we obtain factor eﬃciency-price
equalization because of the mobile-factors firms, which pin down the relative factor
prices for the whole economy.12
12This weak form of FPE is consistent with Trefler’s (1993) and Debaere’s (2003) empirical evi-
dence.
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The overall capital eﬃciency-labor ratio and labor allocations of the small open
economy will depend on its specific-factors endowment and so, in general, they will
diﬀer from those of the world economy. Note that the equality ni = n∗i , for all i = x, c,
implies that a lower endowment of a given natural resource will make it optimal to
allocate a lower fraction of labor to the sector that employs this specific factor. That
is, denoting with an asterisk the world’s relative endowments, if νi < ν∗i then li < l
∗
i
and vice versa.
Regarding the capital stock, we can use equations (8), (9), and (20) to (22) applied
to the small economy to get that
lct =
θk (1− αk − αn)
θk (1− αn)− αk
"
1 + lx
θn
1− θk − θn
−
µ
1− θk
θk
¶
k˜t
ω˜kt
#
, (29)
where lx is the constant labor share employed in investment-goods production with
specific inputs when all technologies are used, which we obtained in (24).
At the steady state, the eﬃciency-wage capital rental ratio equals the interna-
tional relative factor price, ω˜k = ω˜∗k, which is independent of factor endowments.
If the diﬀerence in relative endowments comes only from the specific-factor in the
consumption-goods sector, then lx = l∗x and the eﬀect on the long-run capital stock
will depend on the relative capital intensities across sectors. In particular, if the
investment sector is more capital intensive (i.e., θk (1− αn) − αk > 0), we have an
inverse relationship between k˜ and νc. That is, νc > ν∗c implies that lc > l∗c and from
(29) we obtain that k˜ < k˜∗; and vice versa, νc < ν∗c implies that k˜ > k˜∗. But if
the consumption sector is more capital intensive than the production of investment
goods under the non-specific-factors technology, we get the opposite, k˜ is positively
related to νc.
On the other side, when the diﬀerence in relative endowments comes only from
the specific-factor in the investment-goods sector, we have the following. If νx > ν∗x,
then lx > l∗x and, everything else equal, expression (29) implies that k˜ > k˜∗; and the
other way round if νx < ν∗x. At first sight, this result seems independent of the input
shares across activities.13 However, the result rests on the assumption that the capital
shares are the same in technologies (6) and (7); which implies that the industry that
produces investment goods using specific inputs is more capital intensive than the
13Notice that because p∗ is exogenous to the small open economy, lc becomes independent of Nx
at steady state. Hence, regardless of the factor intensities, k˜ has to move always inversely with lx
when νx varies in order to keep the equality lc = l∗c in equation (29).
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one that only employs mobile factors.
In sum, a small economy that diﬀers from the rest of the world only in the amount
of Nc will have its long-run capital stock above the world’s average if and only if (i)
its endowment is above the world’s average and (ii) the consumption-goods sector
is more capital intensive than the production of the investment good that does not
use specific-factors. On the contrary, given that we suppose that investment-goods
production with specific factors is relatively capital intensive, a larger endowment of
the natural input Nx will always increase long-run capital.
Changes in the stock of the natural inputs have a similar eﬀect on long-run per
capita income yt. To see this, notice that using expressions (5) to (7) and (8), we can
write the level of GDP per capita yt = Et[lctyct + pt(lxtyxt + l¯xty¯xt)] as
yt = Et
n
lctAn
αn
ct k˜
αk
ct + ptB
h
lxtnθnxt k˜
θk
xt + (1− lct − lxt)˜¯k
θk
xt
io
. (30)
When the increase is in Nx, lx will rise exactly in the same proportion (to restore
nx = n∗x), and this increase will be exactly equal to the decrease in lx because lc
remains constant. Since all relative uses of inputs will remain unchanged, we have
that output in the consumption sector will not change, dyc = 0, and the change in
long-run income will be determined by the following expression:
dy = Etp∗B(nθnx k
θk
x − ˜¯kθkx )dlx = Etp∗B˜¯kθkx
µ
1− θk
1− θk − θn
− 1
¶
dNx
L
. (31)
The last equality comes from the equalization of labor productivity across sectors
and the fact that dnx = 0. Notice that the denominator and numerator of the first
term inside the parentheses equal, respectively, the labor shares in investment-goods
production with and without specific factors. Therefore, the sign of dy/dNx is positive
because the technology using only mobile inputs has a larger labor share than the
specific-factor technology to produce x-goods.
Similarly, when the change comes only from the specific factor Nc, output of firms
producing the investment goods with the specific-factor technology will not change,
dyx = 0, and the increase in yc will come at the expense of a reduction in yx. The
increase in lc will be exactly equal to the decrease in lx. Following the same steps as
in (31) we find that the change in overall income per capita is
dy = Etp∗B˜¯kθkx
µ
1− θk
1− αk − αn
− 1
¶
dNc
L
. (32)
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Thus, an increase in Nc will increase overall output if and only if the technology that
uses only mobile inputs possesses a larger labor share than the production of c-goods
(i.e.: θk < αk + αn).
The next proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 4 A small open economy that has Nx > 0 and Nc > 0 such that con-
ditions (14) and (28) hold accumulates capital until factor eﬃciency-price equaliza-
tion holds. The country’s steady-state income level will increase with Nx, because
investment-goods production with specific inputs is more capital intensive than man-
ufacturing with only mobile factors. On the contrary, long-run income will decrease
(increase) with Nc if the consumption-goods sector has a relatively larger (smaller)
labor share.
The lesson from this section is that the impact on the economy’s income level
of the factor endowment that is specific to a given activity critically depends on the
input elasticities of this activity. Note that this implication follows from Rybczynski-
type eﬀects which are underlying in the production structure. To illustrate this point,
suppose that our small economy is identical to the rest of the world and has already
reached the steady state. Then, given the steady state prices, an increase in the
small economy’s endowment of a specific-factor Ni will imply an increase in the share
of labor employed by firms that use this specific input and, as a result, an increase
in their output. This is done through a shift of labor and capital from firms that
use the mobile inputs technology and so it is done at the expense of a fall in their
investment-goods output.
In summary, output prices are determined by international markets and this equal-
izes the input-eﬃciency-rental rates of the small economy to those of the world econ-
omy; as a result the fraction of labor employed by the small economy in an activity
that uses a specific factor is solely determined by the world’s technique n∗i and its
own endowment of the specific factor Ni. Any change in Ni, everything else constant,
implies a reallocation of labor (and capital) between the specific-factor activity i and
the activity that only requires mobile inputs. Whether the overall change in aggre-
gate production translates into more income relative to the world’s average relies
on the relative labor shares between these two production activities. A small-open
economy with a larger endowment of a factor specific to an activity that is more
capital intensive than the mobile inputs technology will accumulate more capital,
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and will enjoy larger long-run income. But a larger endowment of a factor specific to
an activity that is less capital intensive than the mobile inputs technology will lead
the economy to a lower capital stock in the long-run that will oﬀset the benefits of
the larger endowment if the specific-factor technology has a larger labor elasticity,
leading the economy toward a balanced-growth path characterized by smaller income
levels.14
4.1 A numerical exercise
We finish this section with a quantitative measure of the eﬀects on long-run income
of changes in Ni endowments and diﬀerences in labor shares across sectors. We focus
on the special case that Nx is mineral reserves and Nc is land.15 To obtain values
for the labor shares, we take the US economy as the reference for the world economy.
The US average labor shares in Mining and in Agriculture have been, respectively,
of 40 percent and 74 percent over the period 1987-2001.16 So, we shall assume that
1− θk − θn and 1− αk − αn take on 0.40 and 0.74, respectively.
Notice that the world-economy’s income level is not aﬀected by changes in the
small economy. Hence, the increase in long-run income relative to the world econ-
omy’s when specific factor Ni rises can be directly determined by the following ex-
pression:
d(y/y∗)
dvi
=
dy/dvi
y∗
=
1−θk
si
− 1
1 +
³
αk+αn−θk
1−αk−αn
´
l∗c +
³
θn
1−θk−θn
´
l∗x
, (33)
where si is the labor elasticity in the Ni industry, and li is the fraction of labor em-
ployed by the world economy in that sector at steady state (i = c, x). The numerator
of this expression follows from (31) for the case dvx, and from (32) for the case dvc.
The denominator follows from (30) taking into account (13). The steady state value
l∗x is determined from (24), and l∗c is computed from (25) taking into account (20) and
(23). Because l∗x and l∗c are invariant to changes in the small economy, expression (33)
14See Proposition 5 in Appendix B for the eﬀects of specific-factor endowments when FPE does
not hold.
15Defining and providing a consistent measure of all types of Ni endowments and their shares in
sectorial production are beyond the scope of this article.
16Data obtained from the Annual Industry Accounts published on line by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis at http://www.bea.gov. Labor shares are computed as compensations of employees plus
proprietor’s income divided by GDP net of indirect taxes. Notice that this measure should be seen
as an upper bound, since proprietor’s income includes labor as well as some land and capital rents.
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Table 1: Changes in relative long-run income
αk = 0.16, αn = 0.10
d(y/y∗)
dvx
d(y/y∗)
dvc
θk = 0.4, θn = 0.2 0.597 -0.226
θk = 0.3, θn = 0.3 0.784 -0.057
θk = 0.2, θn = 0.4 0.931 0.076
defines a constant derivative. The ultimate reason is that, under international FPE,
input rental prices in the small economy are independent of domestic endowments.
To obtain numerical predictions from (33), we need to calibrate all its parameters.
We give a value of 0.64 to p∗. This price is the US average price of equipment relative
to consumption in 1985 reported by Eaton and Kortum (2001). We normalize B
to one and obtain the value for A consistent with the equilibrium price p∗ = 0.64,
assuming that the world’s relative endowments are ν∗c = 2 and ν∗x = 0.025. The
value ν∗c = 2 is very close to the 1.9 arable-land-hectares per worker (average for
the period 1967-1996) given for the U.S. by the Food and Agricultural Organization
of the United Nations (FAO). The value of ν∗x = 0.025, in turn, is chosen so that
condition (14) holds.17 We have also computed relative income variations for other
relative endowment values such that (14) holds, and obtain no significative changes
in the results. The rest of parameters take standard values, they are calibrated so
that the steady state interest rate is 6 percent. In particular, we have assumed that
β = 0.98, σ = 1, δ = 0.06, and g = 0.02.
The results are reported in Table 1, and correspond to a land share (αn) of 10
percent in the value added of consumption goods. A land share of 5 percent gener-
ated almost the same predictions and they are not reported. Results are obtained
maintaining the labor shares constant in both sectors, for diﬀerent elasticities in the
investment-goods sector.
The Table shows something that we already know: what really matters for the
sign of the Nc eﬀect, given a labor share in the consumption sector of 0.74, is the
value of θk. When θk is below 0.26, the labor share in the non-specific factor industry
is larger than in the consumption sector, and then an increase in Nc translates into
17As we mentioned in section 2, we can really choose any amount for ν∗c and ν∗x because their
values ultimately depend on the units of measurement. This does not mean though that there is no
discipline in the exercise. These arbitrarily chosen values aﬀect the domain (νx, νc) that is compatible
with the coexistence of the three technologies in the small economy. See below.
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an income improvement. We also observe that the eﬀect of changes in Ni decreases
with θk, and that the eﬀect of Nx on income is stronger (absolute value) than the
eﬀect of Nc. The main reason is that the eﬀect is driven by diﬀerences in the labor-
elasticity between the specific-factor activities and the non-specific-factor sector, and
this diﬀerence is always smaller in the case of consumption-goods production. Finally,
the table says that a one-unit increase in vx endowment implies an increase in relative
income between 0.59 (θk = 0.4) and 0.93 (θk = 0.2). Whereas the induced variation
in relative income by the same increase in vc is between −0.23 (θk = 0.4) and 0.08
(θk = 0.2).
Let us focus on the case θk = 0.4, which represents an empirically supported value
for the economy’s aggregate capital share. For this value of θk, proposition 3 implies
that the maximum values of νc and νx for which the three technologies are operated
in the small economy are 2.37 if νx = ν∗x and 0.55 if νc = ν∗c , respectively. Hence, the
model predicts that, ceteris paribus, a nation with a νc endowment of 0.36 would be
about 46 percent richer than a nation with νc = 2.36. Whereas a country with a νx
endowment of 0.51 would be 30 percent richer than a nation with νx = 0.01. We then
conclude from the numerical experiment that increases in specific factor endowments
can have positive or negative Rybczynski-type eﬀects on the long-run income of small
open economies, and that these eﬀects can be substantial.
A final issue that we must address is whether the domain that sustains an equilib-
rium in which the three technologies coexist, that is, (νc, νx) with νc ∈ (0, 2.37) and
νx ∈ (0, 0.55) is very restrictive. The answer is that it is not. On the one hand, the
FAO data show that 98 percent of nations possess a number of arable-land hectares
per worker (averages for the period 1967-1990) below 2.37, and the minimum number
is 0.002. The values of νx, on the other, greatly depend on the type of mineral at
which we look and the units of measurement. For example, looking at the numbers
across nations published for 1997 by the Energy Information Administration (US
Department of Energy, International Energy Annual 2002), the minimum of mineral
reserves is zero, and the maximum is 0.014 million short tons per worker and year if
we refer to coal extraction and 1.64 thousand barrels per worker and day if we refer
to crude oil.
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5 Discussion of results
The model predicts that, under incomplete specialization, possessing a relatively
high aggregate endowment of fixed specific inputs such as natural resources can be a
blessing or a curse in terms of long-run income, depending on the relative labor shares
between the specific factor industry and that one employing only mobile factors.
Larger endowments have a positive direct eﬀect on long-run income but their induced
eﬀect on capital accumulation can be positive or negative depending on the relative
capital intensities across sectors. For example, if the industry using only mobile inputs
is the most labor intensive activity, then larger endowments of specific inputs of any
kind have a positive eﬀect on capital accumulation and on long run income. But if
the production of investment goods using specific inputs is relatively capital intensive
and the production of consumption goods is the most labor intensive activity, then
a larger Nx leads to a higher long-run capital and income level, whereas a bigger Nc
generates a lower steady-state capital and income. Therefore, the model can explain
why some nations that seem to have similar resource endowments can show very
diﬀerent income levels.
Findings are conditioned on the assumptions made. One that is clearly critical
for our results is the existence in equilibrium of at least a technology that exclusively
operates with mobile factors. This assumption permits the model to reconcile specific-
factors frameworks with the evidence presented by Trefler (1993) in favor of (eﬃciency
adjusted) FPE across nations. However, there might be still open economies that are
far away from the average, and in which factor prices are not equalized. Appendix
B shows that, when all firms use specific inputs and there is no FPE, having a
larger labor share in the sector that uses the rising specific factor is still a necessary
condition, but no longer suﬃcient to obtain a negative impact of the larger endowment
on long-run income. Now, suﬃciency requires this sector to be suﬃciently less capital
intensive.
We have also assumed that countries possess resources specific to both industries.
In that scenario, specialization is not possible. However, recent empirical studies
such as Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) and Schott (2003) find evidence that suggests
that some countries are specialized. In Appendix C, we show that when countries
do not possess resources specific to one sector, production specialization is possible,
and that under specialization a larger natural endowment always leads the economy
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to higher capital stocks and income levels in the long-run. The intuition is simple.
Under specialization, a larger specific-factor endowment no longer induces a resource
stealing eﬀect on other sectors. As a consequence, for a suﬃciently large specific-
input endowment, the specialized country can accumulate enough capital so that its
long run income will be above the world’s average.
The findings presented in proposition 4 imply that the model can also predict
overtaking episodes along the adjustment path. Suppose two small nations that begin
their development path at time zero with the same levels of capital per capita k0 < k∗c
(if investment goods are more capital intensive), or k0 < k∗x (if consumption goods
are more capital intensive), and the same levels of eﬃciency E0, labor L and Nx > 0.
Moreover, one economy shares the same relative specific-factor endowments as the
average world economy, νi = ν∗i (i = c, x), but the other one owns a smaller Nc.
18 It
is straightforward that, at the initial time, the country with a smaller natural-input
stock will have a lower income level because it has the same amounts of the other
three inputs. From proposition 4, we know that the natural resource-poorer economy
will accumulate capital faster and, at some point along the development path, will
overtake the resource-richer economy if the consumption-goods sector has a higher
labor share, ending up having higher income levels.
Allowing for diﬀerences in the initial levels of eﬃciency across countries has no
eﬀect on the qualitative results presented in the paper, provided that these diﬀerences
are not too large. But cross-nation productivity disparities would certainly aﬀect the
threshold of the specific-factor endowment that determines when long-run income is
above the world’s average. For example, if a small economy starts up with a lower
eﬃciency level, it will need a smaller endowment of the input specific to the industry
with the largest labor share to be able to overcome the world-economy’s long-run
income. This is so because in our model eﬃciency grows at the same exogenous rate
everywhere and initial productivity diﬀerences will persist.
Some of our results have the flavor of the immiserizing-growth literature. In a
18Actually, the initial capital-labor ratio k0 should be a function of the other factor endowments.
In order to generate overtaking, we need that the resource-poorer economy enjoys a smaller initial
income level. Equation (32) says that when k0 is endogenous this occurs if θk < αk + αn. We
could think that the economies start at time zero from a preindustrial steady-state in which firms
use diﬀerent technologies than in the new long-run situation towards which the development path
converges. In particular, preindustrial technologies make relatively bigger use of animal power and
people’s labor. As a consequence, capital intensities in the preindustrial era are smaller, and more
similar across sectors than in technologies (5) to (7) so that the above inequality holds.
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classical paper, Bhagwati (1958) showed that a reduction in income from worsened
terms of trade can exceed income generated by an augmented capital stock, so that
growth immiserizes.19 In our case the terms of trade of the small economy are fixed,
but the possibility of a lower long-run income associated to a higher specific-factor
endowment arises when the larger endowment of this specific input aﬀects negatively
the long run stock of the accumulable factor.
More specifically within our Walrasian model, laissez faire leads agents to invest
in the consumption-goods sector when the stock of its specific factor rises. Unfortu-
nately, if the production of investment goods is more capital intensive, these short-
run gains can come at a cost of lower future capital and income levels. A benevolent
central planner might then be tempted to intervene if present gains are more than
outweighed by future losses; in that case, an optimal policy must imply a domestic
rate of return on capital above its international level so that the steady state level of
capital associated to a larger stock of Nc is suﬃciently higher than its laissez faire
value. Note that in our Walrasian world economy, the small country faces a relative
price of investment goods that does not respond to changes in local conditions. In
autarky, an increase in Nc has a positive eﬀect on the relative price of investment
goods and on the domestic return on capital, so growth never inmmiserizes. That
is, the rigidity of the world’s relative price with respect to local conditions acts as a
negative externality for the small open economy.
It is therefore clear that besides the positive implications of the model, it also
has normative ones. If the goal of policymakers is to permanently increase income,
subsidizing the exploitation or accumulation of factors that are specific to less capital-
intensive activities can be mistaken. This is not only relevant for natural resources.
We can think for example, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), about an increase in
managerial skills brought into the domestic economy by foreign managers through
foreign direct investment. Our results imply that, only if the skills/knowledge brought
by the foreign managers are not specific to one sector and, in addition, spill over other
activities, an improvement in the economy’s log-run income level will be guaranteed.
For this reason, before implementing this type of policies, it seems important to study
19More recently special attention has been devoted to the ‘harmful’ consequences of natural re-
source discoveries. Such discoveries cause a reallocation of resources from manufacturing and agri-
culture into services (often non-tradeble urban services) that put upward presure on real wages in
terms of tradable goods and so imply a decline in external competitiveness that more than outweighs
the initial boom in income (see Edwards and Van Wijnbergen (1992)).
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the input intensities in the diﬀerent industries and whether factors are mobile across
sectors. More case studies in line with the work of Kohli (1993) for the US economy
but including natural resources should be most helpful.
6 Conclusion
The paper has presented an open-economy version of the two-sector neoclassical
growth model in which investment- and consumption-goods are produced using fixed
specific factors. Our model diﬀers from the dynamic specific-factors model of inter-
national trade in that we allow capital to move freely across sectors and have a third
technology to manufacture investment goods that only requires intersectorally mobile
factors. It is the inclusion of this technology what induces factor-price equalization
across open economies that produce within the diversification cone.
The model predicts that nations that diversify production but possess a relatively
low endowment of factors can outperform countries with a larger natural-resource
endowment. The reason is that a larger specific-input endowment in a less capital-
intensive sector drives the economy towards a long-run allocation with a lower capital
stock, which can completely oﬀset the positive eﬀects of the larger resource stock.
Quite the contrary, if two nations only diﬀer in their input endowment specific to a
relatively capital-intensive industry, the resource-richer nation also becomes the per
capita output-richer economy.
We have argued above that these results possess both positive and normative im-
plications. In addition, our model has also a clear implication for empirical research.
The above findings suggest that in order to disentangle the impact of fixed specific-
factors and, in particular, natural resources on income levels and growth rates, it is
important to carry out the investigation at the sectoral level.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. Suppose that a technology that requires an immobile
factor is not used. The firms that have access to this technology will like to open
if they make profits for the prices (say rˆk, wˆt, rˆnx, rˆnc and pˆ) that prevail in the
equilibrium where the economy is located. In particular, given Nc > 0, a firm in the
consumption-goods sector chooses Kct and Lct to maximize its profits Πct, which is
equivalent to maximizing
A
µ
Kct
EtNc
¶αk µLct
Nc
¶1−αk−αn
− rkt
Kct
EtNc
−wt
Lct
EtNc
− rnct
1
Et
. (34)
The maximum level of profits, per eﬃciency unit of the specific factor, then equals
Πct
EtNc
= αnA
1
αn
µ
1− αk − αn
wt/Et
¶1−αk−αn
αn
µ
αk
rkt
¶ αk
αn
− rnct/Et. (35)
In an equilibrium in which these type of firms do not operate, it must be true that
rˆnct = 0. Hence, in expression (35) maximum profits are strictly positive, for all t.
Given that this problem is identical to the one of the investment-goods sector, firms
that use specific factors will always have incentives to open.
Proof of proposition 2. These firms’ profits equal
Π¯xt = ptBK¯θkxt
¡
EtL¯xt
¢1−θk − rktK¯xt − wtL¯xt. (36)
At the maximum, it must hold that
max
0≤K¯xt≤Kt
0≤L¯xt≤L
Π¯xt = K¯xt
"
rkt
µ
1− θk
θk
¶
− wt
Et
µ
rkt
θkptB
¶ 1
1−θk
#
, (37)
since (EtL¯xt/K¯xt)1−θk = rkt/ptBθk. Let rˆkt, wˆt, and pˆt be the equilibrium market
prices when only firms that use specific inputs operate. Given Et, rˆkt, wˆt, and pˆt,
firms that do not use natural resources will want to enter the market if and only if
they make profits, that is, if and only if
pˆtB >
µ
rˆk
θk
¶θk µ wˆt/Et
1− θk
¶1−θk
, (38)
From optimality conditions (10) and (13) for investment-goods producers that use
specific factors, expression (38) becomes
pˆtB >
Ã
pˆtθkBnθnxt k˜
θk−1
xt
θk
!θ¯k "
(1− θk − θn) pˆtBnθnxt k˜
θk
xt
1− θk
#1−θk
, (39)
which reduces to
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lˆxt >
µ
1− θk − θn
1− θk
¶1−θk
θn
Nx/L. (40)
The variable lˆxt corresponds to the world’s equilibrium when the non-specific
factor technology is not used. At steady state, it is possible to give a closed-form
solution to lˆxt, call it lˆ∗x. In particular, lˆ∗x is determined by the following set of
equations:
θkBνθnx
³
lˆ∗x
´−θn µ θk
1− θk − θn
ω∗k
¶θk−1
= (1 + g)σ β−1 − 1 + δ, (41)
(g + δ)k∗ = Bνθnx
³
lˆ∗x
´1−θn µ θk
1− θk − θn
ω∗k
¶θk
, (42)
p∗ =
Aααkk (1− αk − αn)
1−αk ν∗αnc
³
lˆ∗x
´θn
ω∗αk−θkk
Bθθkk (1− θk − θn)
1−θk ν∗θnx
³
1− lˆ∗x
´αn , (43)
l∗x =
k∗ − αkω
∗
k
1−αk−αn
θkω∗k
1−θk−θn −
αkω∗k
1−αk−αn
. (44)
Equation (41) comes from (10) and (19), equation (42) follows from (18), (43) from
(10), and (44) from (8), (9), (21) and (22), evaluated at the steady state when l¯x = 0.
From the three equations (41), (42) and (44), we can obtain closed solutions for
the three unknowns k∗, ω∗k and l
∗
x. After that, we can solve for p∗ using (43). These
solutions are:
k∗ = Ψω∗k, ω
∗
k = Ψ1, l
∗
x = Ψ2, (45)
where Ψ, Ψ1 and Ψ2 are positive constants given by
Ψ =
αk/ (1− αk − αn)
1− (g+δ)(θk(1−αn)−αk(1−θn))
(β−1(1+g)σ−1+δ)(1−αk−αn)
, (46)
Ψ1 =
(1− θk − θn)
θk
Ã
θkBνθnx Ψ
−θn
2
(1 + g)σ β−1 − 1 + δ
! 1
1−θk
,
Ψ2 =
Ψ− αk1−αk−αn
θk
1−θk−θn −
αk
1−αk−αn
.
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B The small economy when all firms use specific factors
Obviously, proposition 4 holds as long as l¯x > 0. Above some value of Nx and Nc,
the economy will achieve a corner solution in which firms that use the technology
that only requires mobile factors will shut down. Suppose first that condition (40),
or equivalently (14), does not hold, that is
lˆx <
µ
1− θk − θn
1− θk
¶1−θk
θn
Nx/L, ∀t. (47)
Under condition (47), the country will still accumulate capital until its rental rate is
the same as in the world economy, but the rest of factor prices will remain diﬀerent.
At the steady state, the firms’ eﬃciency conditions (10) (taking l¯xt = k¯xt = 0),
(20) and (22) imply that
ω˜k =
µ
1− θk − θn
1− θk
¶
nθn/(1−θk)x ω˜
∗
k. (48)
Notice that nx in (48) equals (Nx/L)/lx. Which in turn implies that ω˜k > ω˜∗k under
condition (47). Since the capital labor ratios in both sectors are proportional to the
relative factor price ω˜k, it follows that the country will be using in the long-run more
capital intensive techniques than the other economies, k˜x > k˜∗x and k˜c > k˜∗c , and that
w > w∗.
If, on the other hand, condition (14) holds but condition (28) does not, we have the
opposite scenario. From expression (48), ω˜k < ω˜∗k. As a consequence, the country
will use in the long-run less capital intensive techniques than the world economy,
k˜x < k˜∗x and k˜c < k˜∗c , and w < w∗.
From equations (10) and (13), we can obtain the following relationship between
the labor allocation and the specific-factors endowment:µ
1− αk − αn
1− θk − θn
¶
(αk/rkt)
αk
1−αk
(θk/rkt)
θk
1−θk
(Aναnc )
1
1−αk³
p∗Bνθnx
´ 1
1−θk
=
(1− lxt)
αn
1−αk
l
θn
1−θk
xt
. (49)
Therefore, when only the technologies that use specific factors operate, lˆxt varies
inversely with νc = Nc/L , and positively with νx = Nx/L and k˜xt. The last rela-
tionship follows because rkt and k˜xt are inversely related (see equation (10)). Notice
also that the right side of (49) describes a strictly decreasing function of lx that goes
from infinity to zero as lx goes from zero to one, and that the left side is a positive
constant independent of lx. Therefore, there exists a unique lx that solves (49). In
turn, this solution evaluated at the steady state and (48) will determine eωk.
Along the balanced-growth path, rkt = r∗k for all t. Expression (49) then implies
that a larger νc decreases the steady-state allocation of labor lx and, therefore, in-
creases lc. Because the allocation of labor to the investment-goods sector goes down,
the capital-labor ratio in this activity must rise to maintain the interest rate invariant
(see expression (10)). The increase of k˜x, in turn, implies that k˜c also rises because,
by optimality conditions (10) and (13), the ratio of k˜c to k˜x is constant. The same
type of reasoning says that an increase in νx decreases lc and raises lx, k˜c and k˜x.
Equation (10) also implies that if k˜i rises, so does ni, for all i = x, c.
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Hence, unlike in the case with the three firm types, an increase in any specific-
factor endowment now may rise the capital-labor ratios of both production activities.
Ceteris paribus, this contributes to raise income. However, even in this case, the final
aggregate capital stock can still diminish (remember equation (9)) if too much labor
is reallocated to the less capital intensive sector, and lead the economy to a lower
long-run output level.
To see this, we can use production functions (5) and (6), conditions (8) and (10)
with l¯xt = 0, and expressions (21) and (22), to write the steady-state income per
capita level when all firms use specific factors as
yt = Et
"
p∗nθnx
µ
θk
r∗k
¶θk# 11−θk ·(1− θk − θn) + lx (θk + θn − αk − αn)
1− αk − αn
¸
. (50)
As we saw in the previous paragraph, when the relative endowment νx rises, the
steady-state labor allocation lx and the value of nx increase. Then, expression (50)
implies that if the investment-goods sector has a larger labor share (θk+θn < αk+αn),
the steady-state income level can decrease with νx. In the same way, an increase in
νc provokes a decline in lx and a larger nx. So an increase in νc can still imply a
decrease in long-run income if the consumption-goods sector is suﬃciently more labor
intensive than the x-sector. In all other cases, the eﬀect of a larger amount of any
specific-factor is positive.
For example, the following are suﬃcient conditions for a negative long-run income
eﬀect. From equation (50), we can easily get that, if Nc increases and dNx = 0,
dyt < 0 iﬀ θk + θn − αk − αn > θn/lx. Given that lx declines with θn, for all
θk > αk + αn, there exists a suﬃciently low θn such that dyt/dNc < 0.
Also from expression (50), it can be shown that, when Nx rises and dNc = 0,
dyt/dNx < 0 iﬀµ
νx
lx
¶−1 (1− θk − θn) + lx (θk + θn − αk − αn)
(1− θk − θn)−
³
1−θk−θn
θn
´
lxt (θk + θn − αk − αn)
<
dlx
dνx
. (51)
Now, take into account that the optimal allocation to lx, given by condition (49),
implies that
dlx
dνx
=
ν−1x
l−1x + αn(1−θk)θn(1−αk) (1− lx)
−1 . (52)
The last two expressions imply that dyt/dNx < 0 iﬀ
(1− θk − θn) + lx (θk + θn − αk − αn)
(1− θk − θn)−
³
1−θk−θn
θn
´
lxt (θk + θn − αk − αn)
<
1
1 + αn(1−θk)θn(1−αk)
³
lx
1−lx
´ .
The right-hand side of this condition goes to one as αn goes to zero, whereas the
left-hand side is always smaller than one if αk + αn > θk + θn. Therefore, for all
αk > θk+ θn, there exists a value of αn suﬃciently small such that the last condition
holds and then dyt/dNx < 0.
The following proposition states the main findings.
Proposition 5 Fix pt = p∗, and Nc, Nx > 0 such that condition (14) or condition
(28) do not hold at steady-state. The country’s steady-state capital-labor ratios will
be above the ones of the world economy if inequality (14) holds; they will be below
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otherwise. In addition, an increase in a specific-factor stock raises the small country’s
steady-state income level if the sector to which the input is specific has a lower labor
share or it has a larger labor share but labor shares across sectors are suﬃciently
similar. The eﬀect is negative if the other sector is suﬃciently more capital intensive.
In sum, when international FPE does not hold in the long run because all firms
produce with specific factors, a negative impact of a larger specific-factor endowment
is still possible. The diﬀerence with respect to the case in which long-run FPE holds is
that having a larger labor intensity in the sector that uses the rising specific factor is
no longer suﬃcient to obtain a negative impact of the larger endowment on long-run
income. Now, suﬃciency requires this sector to be suﬃciently more labor intensive.
C Investment-goods production without specific inputs
When the country does not find in its territory natural resources specific to the
investment-goods production activity, production takes place using only technologies
(5) and (7). Given that Nx equals zero, specialization in consumption-goods produc-
tion is a possible equilibrium outcome. The next proposition establishes conditions
under which this is the case.
Proposition 6 Fix Nx = 0. The investment-goods sector will open if and only if
pt >
A
B
µ
αk
θk
¶θk µ1− αk − αn
1− θk
¶1−θk
ναnc k˜
αk−θk
t (53)
where k˜t denotes the equilibrium stock of capital per eﬃciency unit of labor when only
consumption-goods are manufactured.
The proof to this proposition follows the same logic as the one for proposition
2 above. For this reason it is omitted. Implicitly, expression (53) determines a
minimum price above which it becomes profitable for investment-goods producers to
enter the market. This minimum price depends on the relative endowment of the
specific factor νc, the capital/labor ratio, and factor intensities, let us denote it by
pmin(k˜t; νc). The country then specializes in the production of consumption goods if
pmin(k˜t; νc) is greater than or equal to pt. More specifically, closing the investment-
goods sector becomes more appealing as νc increases and as k˜t and pt decline or, in
other words, as the consumption-goods sector becomes relatively more productive.
Suppose first the situation where the small country’s factor endowments are such
that it produces only consumption goods, remaining specialized in the long run. The
economy accumulates capital through imports of investment goods, with k˜t = k˜ct and
lct = 1 for all t, until the domestic rate of return on capital reaches r∗k. At that point,
the firms’ eﬃciency conditions (10), (11) and (13), and the world’s production steady
state techniques, n∗c and k˜∗c , pin down k˜ as
k˜ = [(νc/ν∗c) l
∗
c ]
αn
1−αk k˜∗c . (54)
The same conditions imply that unlike in the diversified-production scenario, factor
eﬃciency-prices in the specialized economy do not converge to the ones of the rest of
the world. In particular, the relative factor price ω˜k goes up with νc.
However, for (54) to be a steady-state equilibrium, it must be true that it is not
profitable to operate in the investment-goods sector. That is, that condition (53)
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does not hold when capital is given by (54). Substituting (54) into (53), we can
easily find that the country will not diversify production in the long-run if its relative
endowment of the factor specific to the production of consumption goods satisfies
νc ≥ ν∗c/l∗c = n∗c . (55)
Under (55), expression (54) implies that k˜ ≥ k˜∗c . Moreover, long-run capital
is now positively related to Nc. The reason is that an increase in the specific-factor
endowment no longer induces a resource stealing eﬀect on other sectors. Unlike in the
diversified-production scenario, when the country specializes its long-run income level
rises with the endowment of the specific factor. As a consequence, for νc suﬃciently
large, the specialized country can accumulate enough capital so that its long run
income, y = Aναnc k˜αk , will be above the world’s average.
If, on the other hand, the country has νc < n∗c , it produces inside the diversifica-
tion cone at the steady state, and it is straightforward that factor prices and income
then behave as in proposition 4.
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 7 A small open economy with Nx = 0 and νc < n∗c diversifies pro-
duction at the steady state, and its long-run income and factor prices behave as in
proposition 3. If, on the other hand, its endowment νc is larger or equal than n∗c, the
economy specializes in consumption-goods production in the long-run, its eﬃciency-
factor prices do not converge to the world’s prices, and its income level along the
balanced-growth path increases with the endowment specific to the consumption sec-
tor.
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D Appendix for referees, not for publication
These notes are intended to be helpful to the reader carrying out the refereeing job.
They derive some of the analytical expressions contained in the paper.
Equation (4)
It follows directly from the F.O.C’s of the consumer’s problem, which imply that
cσt+1/ (βc
σ
t ) = λt/λt+1,
λtpt = λt+1 [rkt+1 + pt+1 (1− δ)] ,
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint in period t.
Equation (24)
From (13), (20) and (22), we can write
(1− θk − θn) ptBEtnθnxt
·µ
θk
1− θk − θn
¶
ω˜kt
¸θk
= (1− θk) ptBEt
·µ
θk
1− θk
¶
ω˜kt
¸θk
.
And then, since nxt = (Nx/L)/lx, we obtain (24).
Equation (25)
From conditions (13), (20) and (21), we write
(1− αk − αn)AEtnαnct
·µ
αk
1− αn − αk
¶
ω˜kt
¸αk
= (1− θk) ptBEt
·µ
θk
1− θk
¶
ω˜kt
¸θk
.
We then use the fact that nct = (Nc/L)/lc, and get (25).
Equation (27)
Combining (13), and (20) to (23) at steady state
(1− αk − αn)AEtnαnct
"µ
αk
1− αn − αk
¶µ
1− θk
θk
¶µ
θkB
β−1 (1 + g)σ + δ − 1
¶ 1
1−θk
#αk
= (1− θk − θn) ptBEtnθnxt
"µ
θk
1− θk − θn
¶µ
1− θk
θk
¶µ
θkB
β−1 (1 + g)σ + δ − 1
¶ 1
1−θk
#θk
.
Using (24), this simplifies to
p∗ =
A
B
µ
Nc/L
l∗c
¶αn µ1− αk − αn
1− θk
¶1−αk µαk
θk
¶αk µ θkB
β−1 (1 + g)σ + δ − 1
¶αk−θk
1−θk
.
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We need to solve for l∗c . Equations (8), (9) and (26) imply that
l∗c k˜
∗
c + l
∗
xk˜
∗
x + (1− l∗c − l∗x)˜¯k∗x =
·
β−1 (1 + g)σ + δ − 1
θk (δ + g)
¸ h
l∗xk˜
∗
x + (1− lct − lxt)k¯∗x
i
.
Using (20) to (22), we can get:
l∗c
µ
αk (1− θk)
(1− αn − αk) θk
− 1
¶
+ l∗x
µ
1− θk
1− θk − θn
− 1
¶
+ 1
=
·
β−1 (1 + g)σ + δ − 1
θk (δ + g)
¸ ·
l∗x
µ
1− θk
1− θk − θn
− 1
¶
− lct + 1
¸
.
The steady state value of l∗c is then
l∗c =
³
β−1(1+g)σ+δ−1
θk(δ+g)
− 1
´
θn
1−θk−θn
³
1−θk−θn
1−θk
´1−θk
θn Nx
L +
³
β−1(1+g)σ+δ−1
θk(δ+g)
− 1
´
αk(1−θk)
(1−αn−αk)θk +
³
β−1(1+g)σ+δ−1
θk(δ+g)
− 1
´
=
1+ θn1−θk−θn
³
1−θk−θn
1−θk
´1−θk
θn Nx
L
αk(1−θk)
(1−αn−αk)θk
h
β−1(1+g)σ+δ−1−θk(δ+g)
θk(δ+g)
i−1
+ 1
.
Putting together the above expressions for p∗ and l∗c , we obtain (27).
Equation (29)
From (8), (9), and (20) to (22),
lct =
k˜t − ˜¯kxt − lxt(k˜xt − ˜¯kxt)
k˜ct − ˜¯kxt
=
k˜t
ω˜kt
− θk1−θk − lxt
³
θk
1−θk−θn −
θk
1−θk
´
αk
1−αn−αk −
θk
1−θk
=
³
1−θk
θk
´
k˜t
ω˜kt
− 1− lxt
h
θk(1−θk)
(1−θk−θn)θk − 1
i
αk(1−θk)
(1−αn−αk)θk − 1
=
³
1−θk
θk
´
k˜t
ω˜kt
− 1− θn1−θk−θn lxt
αk−θk(1−αn)
(1−αn−αk)θk
.
This is (29).
Equation (33)
Taking into account (13) we can write (30) for the world’s economy at the steady
state as
y∗t = Etp
∗B˜¯k∗θkx
·µ
1− θk
1− αk − αn
¶
l∗c +
µ
1− θk
1− θk − θn
¶
l∗x + (1− l∗c − l∗x)
¸
.
This is the denominator in (33). The numerator is (31) for the case dNx, with
sx = 1− θk − θn, and the numerator is (32) for the case dNc, with sc = 1−αk − αn.
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Equation (52)
We can rewrite equation (49) as
Γν
αn
1−αk
c l
θn
1−θk
xt = ν
θn
1−θk
x (1− lxt)
αn
1−αk ;
where Γ is a constant and represents all terms in (49) that are not explicitly shown
above. Diﬀerentiating this expression and assuming dνc = 0, we can get the following
expression: ·
Γν
αn
1−αk
c
µ
θn
1− θk
¶
l
θn
1−θk
−1
xt +
µ
αn
1− αk
¶
(1− lxt)
αn
1−αk
−1ν
θn
1−θk
x
¸
dlxt
= (1− lxt)
αn
1−αk
µ
θn
1− θk
¶
ν
θn
1−θk
−1
x dvx.
Now substituting the first expression into the second one, we obtain:·µ
θn
1− θk
¶
l−1xt +
µ
αn
1− αk
¶
(1− lxt)−1
¸
ν
θn
1−θk
x (1− lxt)
αn
1−αk dlxt
= (1− lxt)
αn
1−αk
µ
θn
1− θk
¶
ν
θn
1−θk
−1
x dvx.
This simplifies to equation (52).
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